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HOW LAWYERS (COME TO) SEE THE WORLD: A
NARRATIVE THEORY OF LEGAL PEDAGOGY
Randy D. Gordon*
FOREWORD
The following article is the first in a series to be published over the
next three issues of the Review. Each of the articles engages the recent
Carnegie Report on legal education from a different angle. In the first
article, I spin together two strands generally related to education, one being
the popular notion that education should serve democratic ends, the other
being the more particular observation that American legal education suffers
from a dearth of imagination. I anchor the discussion by examining some
of the recurring criticisms lodged against legal education (e.g., those raised
in the Carnegie Report) and attend in particular to the casebook method of
instruction and identifies a paucity of narrative in that method as a serious
deficiency. But this deficiency is not one unique to legal education; in fact,
it arises not from law schools per se but from their primary object of study:
the appellate opinion. By studying appellate opinions-which by design
already squeeze narratives beyond recognition-to extract rules, law
students are trained to read (and think) in a narrowly instrumental way.
This pedagogical defect is demonstrated through a close reading of cases
and several casebooks and concludes with a practical (and relatively simple)
suggestion for ameliorating this problem and speculates how the solution
will not only improve legal education but also strengthen democratic
* Ph.D., Edinburgh; LL.M., Columbia; J.D., Washburn; Ph.D., M.A., B.A., Kansas. Partner
with the firm of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, adjunct faculty member in law and English at
Southern Methodist University. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do
not necessarily represent those of the firm or its clients. For a different contextualization of some
of the materials discussed below, see Chapter 4 ("Narrative as Democratic Reasoning") in RANDY
D. GORDON, REHUMANIZING LAW: A THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (2010).
This article benefited from comments received at two conferences, the International
Conference on the Future of Legal Education (Georgia State) and Law, Culture and the
Humanities (Suffolk). Thanks to Clark Cunningham and Jay Mootz, respectively, for inviting me
to participate. Special thanks go to Zenon Bankowski and the late Neil MacCormick of the
University of Edinburgh for comments on another version of this paper. And thanks, too, to my
fellow Fellows of the Dallas Institute of Humanities & Culture, who commented on yet another
version during our 2007 Symposium on "Ties That Bind."
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institutions.
In the second article, Arts, Ethics, and the Carnegie Report on Legal
Education, Maksymilian Del Mar argues that the development of ethical
education in law schools ought not be restricted to the use of textual
resources. Historically, text has been the principal object of analysis in
legal theory, legal scholarship, and legal practice. To combat this
overreliance on text, he first turns to those traditions of moral philosophy
that emphasize the importance of "vision" as a form of moral discipline.
Then, moving to the Carnegie Report, Del Mar argues that we ought not
subsume the development of ethical education under the canopy of
professionalism-a canopy already saturated with text. He posits, rather,
that the profession of law can be rescued from its ever-increasing formalism
and commercialization only through instruments that lie outside the
profession-in a word, through "art." Finally, he makes a number of policy
recommendations based on the results of the Beyond Text in Legal
Education project at the University of Edinburgh. These recommendations
include specific examples of exercises designed to help us "unlearn"
traditional ways of reading legal texts and approaches to legal language.
In the third article, Vico, Llewelyn, and the Task of Legal Education,
Jay Mootz proposes that contemporary discussions about reforms in legal
education should be put into a broader historical, philosophical, and ethical
perspective. Specifically, he argues that legal education suppresses law's
rhetorical roots, and that this failure is both textual and non-textual in
nature. Mootz draws inspiration from an oration delivered by the Italian
humanist Giambattista Vico three hundred years ago and an essay published
by the American law professor Karl Llewellyn seventy-five years ago. In
his oration, "On the Study Methods of Our Time," Vico lamented the rise of
Cartesian critical philosophy at the expense of the cultivation of
imagination, prudence, and eloquence. And because Vico discussed law
and legal education as his principal example, his oration provides an
incredible resource for contemporary deliberations. Llewellyn, too, saw
law as something more than a technical discipline and encouraged his
students to discover the rhetorical nature of law's encounters with the larger
social drama within which it subsists. Together, then, Vico and Llewellyn
offer potent authority for reforms in legal education-reforms aimed at
engaging students in law as a complex and dynamic social reality.
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INTRODUCTION
Commentators from John Dewey to Ronald Dworkin have argued that
education is essential to the development of a truly democratic society.
But the emphasis of this commentary typically focuses somewhat narrowly
on the content of secondary education or the general need for access to
higher education. Dworkin, for instance, believes that many of the most
important social issues of the day are so complicated that they are beyond
the judgment of many ordinary voters, thus causing them to vote (if at all)
2for candidates based on religious affiliation or personal attractiveness. As
an antidote, he suggests that the secondary curriculum be overhauled to
include "courses that take up issues that are among the most contentious
political controversies of the day . . . . This aim, though laudable, is likely
difficult to achieve (as Dworkin readily concedes). For this reason, I've
elected to set my sights somewhat lower and to consider whether a narrative
theory of law offers opportunities to introduce reforms in legal education
that could facilitate democratic ends without creating the political
difficulties inherent in Dworkin's proposal.
It sometimes seems as if there are as many accounts of law as there
are theorists to sponsor them: formalistic/scientific, realistic, autopoietic,
positivist, pragmatic, feminist, Critical Legal Studies (CLS), institutional,
post-colonial, and so on. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, narrative
theory offers a partial (yet nonetheless significant) account of some aspects
4
of legal systems and related democratic institutions. It is not a
comprehensive normative theory of how judges, legislators, and other legal
actors should conduct the business of the law. In this respect, I think the
narrative theory, as I have stated it, bears some resemblance to the most
current version of law and economic theory. When I say "current," I am
thinking foremost of Judge Posner's latest reflections on the subject; his
thoughts are of special importance because he was an early, and certainly
the most visible, proponent of economic legal analysis. Posner once hoped
1. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (Free Press 1997) (1916); RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY
POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE (2006).
2. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 147-50.
3. Id. at 148-49.
4. RANDY D. GORDON, REHUMANIZING LAW: A THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (2010).
5. Posner's most influential work in the law and economics vein began to appear in the early
1970s. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 201 (1971); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757
(1975) [hereinafter The Economic Approach]. The seminal work in what we now think of as law-
and-economics analysis traces to a decade earlier, especially with the work of (now Judge) Guido
Calabresi and Ronald Coase. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. &
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that economics held the interdisciplinary key that would unlock the secret to
a perfectly functioning legal system (and explain the breakdowns in less
than perfectly functioning legal systems). Thus, in 1975, he was able to
opine that:
[An] important finding emerging from the recent law and economics
research is that the legal system itself-its doctrines, procedures, and
institutions-has been strongly influenced by a concern (more often
implicit than explicit) with promoting economic efficiency. . . . The
idea that the logic of the law is really economics is, of course,
repulsive to many academic lawyers, who see in it an attempt by
practitioners of an alien discipline to wrest their field from them. Yet
the positive economic analysis of legal institutions is one of the most
promising as well as most controversial branches of the new law and
economics. It seeks to define and illuminate the basic character of the
legal system, and it has made at least some progress toward that
ambitious goal.6
More recently, however, Posner has retreated from the notion of an all-
embracing theory of law formed by yoking the precepts of a unified
normative system (like utilitarianism) to the teachings of economics.
But that does not mean that economics does not inform legal analysis
in deep and significant ways. For good or ill, economic concepts have
swamped all others in my primary practice area (antitrust). In most federal
courts, an antitrust plaintiff cannot get out of the gate in most types of cases
brought under the Sherman Act unless he can plead-in his initial
complaint-that competition has been injured in a market defined in precise
economic terms. This holds true for all suits, no matter how ruthlessly
anticompetitive the conduct at issue is alleged to be. As a consequence, it is
impossible to practice or to teach antitrust law without having a solid
working knowledge of economic concepts. Antitrust law thus illustrates
one of many doctrinal corners of the law that has become inherently
interdisciplinary both as a matter of practice and pedagogy. As Posner
EcON. 1 (1960).
6. The Economic Approach, supra note 5, at 763-64.
7. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 78 (2003) (stating that "[i]t
has been many years since I flirted with such an approach" regarding the legal and economical
method).
8. See, e.g., Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., 300 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 2002)
("Where the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with reference to the rule of
reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand, or alleges a proposed relevant
market that clearly does not encompass all interchangeable substitute products even when all
factual inferences are granted in plaintiff's favor, the relevant market is legally insufficient, and a
motion to dismiss may be granted.").
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aptly observes,
[o]ne by-product of [law and economics] research that has
considerable pedagogical importance has been the assignment of
precise economic explanations to a number of fundamental legal
concepts that had previously puzzled students and their professors,
such as "assumption of risk," "pain and suffering" as a category of tort
damages, contract damages for loss of expectation, plea bargaining,
and the choice between damages and injunctive relief.
What is important here is the way that economics has been seamlessly
integrated into a wide range of doctrinal law school courses, rather than
being cabined solely in a "Law and Economics" seminar, as are so many
supposed "interdisciplinary" offerings. It is this aspect that is worth
exploring at length in the context of narrative theory, but a consideration of
broader issues in legal education must come first.
THE "DISCIPLINE" OF LAW SCHOOLS
Outside the west entrance to Columbia Law School stands Jacques
Lipchitz's massive Bellerophon Taming Pegasus.'o The sculpture towers
9. The Economic Approach, supra note 5, at 764.
10. I have drawn the basic factual background on the sculpture from Columbia's own account.
6232010]
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over Revson Plaza, into which it is seemingly spiked, and-with its furious
circularity-contrasts neatly with the strong vertical lines of the main Law
School building (not so affectionately known to its current and former
students as "The Toaster").1  I mention its context because this is a case in
which context is of extraordinary interpretive importance, as Lipchitz
himself suggested: "Don't expect a blinded lady with scales and all those
things from me," when Columbia Law School approached him in 1964 with
the proposed commission. 12 Lipschitz continued, "I will try to think of
something else." 3 What he thought of was a particular Greek myth, the
story of how Bellerophon-armed with a golden bridle that Athena
provided-tamed Pegasus and used him to complete a series of tests that
Zeus had devised.14 To Lipchitz, the story of Bellerophon represented the
dominance of man over nature: "You observe nature, make conclusions,
and from these you make rules ... and law is born from that . . . ."
Against this backdrop, there are, I think, two overlapping ways of
looking at the sculpture that are relevant to our discussion, each of which is
suggested by a different word in the sculpture's literal context. First, we
can emphasize the word "law" in Columbia Law School. From that vantage
point, the bridle represents law, one of the instruments with which man
gains dominion over nature. Second, we can emphasize "school." From
that perspective, the bridle represents legal pedagogy, the way that students
are taught "to think like a lawyer." I think one wag of a law professor
opened this second line of inquiry-though facetiously, of course-when
he told the New York Times at the installation ceremony, "That looks like
me trying to teach criminal law."' 6
If we think about the word education, and look at the fossilized
metaphor within it, "to lead," we instantly see the link to Bellerophon and
his bridle and the further problematic associations of that image: break to
lead, break to ride.17 The Carnegie Report tacitly examines the disturbing
implications of this image by, ironically enough, picking through some of
That information and more can be found at Flying Horses, Tightrope Walkers and Other Campus
Icons, Columbia Law School, Aug. 2007, http://www.law.columbia.edu/mediajinquiries/
newsevents/2007/augustO7/sculptures [hereinafter Flying Horses] (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally ROBERT GRAVES, GREEK GODS AND HEROES 74-76 (1960) for the full story
of Bellerophon.
15. Flying Horses, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. Dean David Schizer speaks from time to time about the ambiguous meaning of the
sculpture and its placement.
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the talks that Professor Karl Llewellyn gave to his first-year law students at
Columbia (decades before the Bellerophon-Pegasus sculpture was installed
on the campus). In these talks, which he later expanded and collected in
The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn explained the process of legal education in
terms that frankly admit, and seemingly revel in, its dehumanizing aspects:
It is not easy thus to turn human beings into lawyers. Neither is it safe.
For a mere legal machine is a social danger. Indeed, a mere legal
machine is not even a good lawyer. It lacks insight and judgment. It
lacks the power to draw into hunching that body of intangibles that lie
in the social experience. None the less, it is an almost impossible
process to achieve the technique without sacrificing some humanity
first. Hence, as rapidly as we may, we shall first cut under all the
attributes of homo, though the sapiens we shall then duly endeavor to
develop will, we hope, regain the homo.19
If there's any doubt that this "cutting under" that Llewellyn identifies is
anything other than Bellerophonic violence, that doubt is erased as
Llewellyn "warms to his theme":
The first year . . .. lays a foundation simultaneously for law school and
law practice. It aims, in the old phrase, to get you "thinking like a
lawyer." The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common
sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of
social policy, your sense of justice-to knock these out of you along
with woozy thinking, along with ideas all fuzzed along their edges.
You are to acquire ability to think precisely, to analyze coldly, to work
within a body of materials that is .ven, to see, and see only, and
manipulate the machinery of the law.
Times have not changed all that much, as the Carnegie Report
confirms in its observation that the "temporary moral lobotomy" is still a
prominent feature of contemporary law school pedagogy.2 1 Philip Kissam
thus likens legal education to a Foucaultian discipline. In his The
18. wILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 77-78 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH 116 (Oceana Publications 1996) (1930)).
19. Id. at 78 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 101 (Oceana Publications
1996) (1930)).
20. Id. at 77-78 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 116 (Oceana Publications
1996) (1930)).
21. Id. at 78.
22. PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN
LAWYERS 4 (2003). Kissam is picking up on Michel Foucault's suggestion that social institutions
are built around systems of disciplinary power designed to make people compliant, efficient
producers. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
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Discipline of Law Schools: The Making of Modern Lawyers, Kissam is
concerned with testing many of the cherished assumptions upon which
American legal education has rested since Llewellyn's time and decades
23before. While his critique is comprehensive, this article focuses on a
couple of his points-viz., how law schools teach students to read, write,
and therefore think about the law in ways that are ultimately constraining,
yet needlessly so:
The discipline teaches instrumentalist habits of reading and writing
that both empower and limit future lawyers. These habits consist of
quick, productive but often superficial ways of reading legal texts and
writing about law, and they are linked to the law school's distinctive
oral culture, which celebrates oral heroism and tacitly devalues
complex reading and writing. The law school's distinctive oral culture
in turn rests upon the discipline's case method, its large amphitheater
classrooms, its Moot Court exercises and the speech-like forms of
effective final examination writing. But this oral culture and the
instrumentalist reading and writing habits of law schools tend to
subordinate more complicated, more reflective, more critical and more
24imaginative ways of reading, writing and thinking about the law.
One aspect of this stands out above all others: the reliance on the case law
method and the specialized narrative form upon which it is based.
Many observers of legal pedagogy hold that the case method is linked
with the popular self-belief that the law school's highest mission is to teach
how to-as Llewellyn stated in the quotation above-"think like a
,,25
lawyer. When the case method arced into ascendancy in the late
nineteenth century, there were few options for learning law other than
through apprenticeships or "reading" law, the latter of which amounted to
reasoning out legal propositions by seeing what courts had done when faced
26
with different fact patterns. In 1870, the notion of learning law by reading
about it was formalized in the system devised by Christopher Columbus
Langdell, the then-Dean of Harvard Law School, which promoted the use of
casebooks and the study of appellate court opinions as the primary means of
learning to apply reason to legal materials. The Langdellian system has
Sheridan Trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
23. KISSAM, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 47; Nancy B. Rapoport, Is "Thinking Like
a Lawyer" Really What We Want to Teach?, I J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 91, 95
(2002).
26. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 47.
27. Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the Research
University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1965, 1970 (1999).
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without doubt been modified over the course of more than a century, but I
think that most law professors in the United States would probably agree
that the casebook/case method of instruction still rules the schools,
especially in first-year core classes. It thus behooves us to consider exactly
what this "method" entails.
Casebooks are, as Kissam aptly and ironically describes them, "large
heavy books that are bound in serious, somber colors, blue, black or deep
red, and carry serious, somber titles such as 'Contracts Law: Cases and
Materials' or 'Federal Income Taxation."' 28 These books consist largely of
excerpts of appellate court opinions (in some subjects mostly from the
United States Supreme Court), together with summaries of related cases,
blurbs from scholarly writing, and a few discussion questions and
hypotheticals. Some casebooks-especially those prepared by editors with
cross-disciplinary leanings (e.g., economics)-may also include materials
designed to provide an analytical framework within which to evaluate
particular decisions. But, as Professor Michael Hoeflich has observed, even
in doctrinally expansive casebooks, "the editors rarely consider the broader
context of the case as published nor do they suggest that reported decisions
may not, in fact, give full accounts of 'what really happened."'29 By
"broader context" Hoeflich is thinking principally of things social and
historical-i.e., the sort of materials that would make it possible for a reader
"to understand and evaluate the origin, historic rationale, or legitimacy of
the decision., 30 As a consequence, Kissam concludes, "[t]he structure of
casebooks makes it difficult to understand opinions as comprehensible
narratives, as comprehensible parts of larger coherent doctrinal or social
contexts, or as useful subjects for the development of legal arguments,
counter-arguments and criticism." 3 1
How is it that nearly the entire profession of law teaching came to rely
on teaching materials that are so open to criticism? The answer is found in
the pedagogical system that the casebooks are intended to serve: the case
method.
[This method] rests upon the belief of Langdell that law was a science
and that law had underlying and universally applicable laws just as did
the physical sciences. He further believed that these rules could best
be learned by students through a process of exploration of what he
28. KISSAM, supra note 22, at 31.
29. M. H. Hoeflich, On Reading Cases: The Law Student in Wonderland, 42 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1163, 1180 (1991).
30. Id.; see also Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 91, 93 (2001) ("What is going on in the case is very largely incomprehensible.").
31. KISSAM, supra note 22, at 32.
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considered to be the raw material of the Common Law: appellate
decisions. Thus, the purpose of introducing students to cases in the
law school curriculum was not to teach them how to read cases
critically nor to teach them how the law works in action, nor to teach
the relationship between law and society. Rather, the purpose of
teaching through cases was to teach students how to read cases for
doctrinal rules and teach students how to distinguish between various
fact patterns so as to determine which doctrinal rules would apply in
new circumstances. This is the essence of what has come to be called
"black letter law." The casebook as a teaching device derives directly
from the need of the case method teacher to have a series of cases
which clearly and concisely lay out the doctrinal rules that the law
professor wants to teach.32
This emphasis on rule-identification has of course moderated over time, as
witnessed by, for instance, the inclusion of social policy and interpretive
theory discussions in casebooks and classrooms. But the method's
primacy-especially in first-year classes-remains assured for a variety of
reasons that range from the perceived need to conduct large classes in an
orderly fashion, to base grading on end-of-the-semester, issue-spotting
examinations, and ultimately to prepare students for rule-driven bar
examinations.33
The case method no doubt effectively serves these needs. This service
comes, however, at a significant associated cost, as the Carnegie Report
makes clear.34 There is a basic polarity in how lawyers think and thereby
perform their greater social functions. In one mode, the analytical, "things
and events are detached from the situations of everyday life and represented
in more abstract and systematic ways."35 This way of thinking promotes
stability and consistency. In the other mode, the narrative, "things and
events are given significance through being placed in a story, an ongoing
context of meaningful interaction." Things human (e.g., meaning and
values) reside here. Both modes are vital and significant, but the case
method privileges the former over the latter, as the Carnegie Report finds:
[The analytical mode] holds out the prestige of academic recognition,
likely career success, and the apparent satisfactions of remaining too
tough to fall into Llewellyn's "woozy thinking." [The narrative mode]
continues to make appeals to conscience and the ideals of the
32. Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1178-79.
33. See KISSAM, supra note 22, at 37-50.
34. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 82-84.
35. Id. at 83.
36. Id.
628 [Vol. 56
A Narrative Theory of Legal Pedagogy
profession. However, by now it should be obvious that this is by no
means an even contest for the hearts and minds of law students. The
first-year experience as a whole, without conscious and systematic
efforts at counterbalance, tips the scales, as Llewellyn put it, away
from cultivating the humanity of the student and towards the student's
re-engineering into a "legal machine."37
With this backcloth stitched into place, the next issue is the central
feature of the case method, viz. the edited appellate opinion, and what that
implies. An appellate opinion almost always takes a narrative shape, but
that narrative is highly concentrated and formalized. The final opinion in
any given case stands at the head of a series of narrative regressions, those
resulting from opinions below, testimony of parties and witnesses,
statements and briefs of counsel, and, no doubt, many others. The opinion
that we find in a reporter is thus just the last-not the only-narrative in the
record of a case, even though over time it may be the only generally
available trace of a matter that is left to posterity. But by no means can
the opinion be taken as a complete statement of what really happened as a
matter of history. At most, the facts as stated are conclusive only in the
sense that they may bind the parties and perhaps those in privity with them.
In sum, narrative coherence comes at the expense of narrative
completeness. And this has undesirable pedagogical consequences because,
as the Carnegie Report warns, casebook opinions are highly reduced
accounts of litigation that can give the misleading impression that "facts"
are easily discovered, rather than resulting from multiple (usually
39
conflicting) interpretations and presentations.
The version of an opinion that we find in a casebook (because of
editing, topical organization, and surrounding commentary) is in some
sense a revision and re-contextualization of a case's final narrative. Though
extrajudicial, this type of modification is of great importance because many
bedrock cases are never read by lawyers outside of law school. As such, it
suffers from two inherent deficiencies. First, as with the full version
published in a reporter, the casebook version is cut off from the underlying
narrative record upon which it is based. We must thus take it on faith that
the judge who wrote a particular opinion did so in good faith and fairly and
accurately described the facts, but this cannot always be the case; "we must
also, in this post-Realist world, accept the possibility that judges edit the
37. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 84.
38. In a masterful examination of law's untold stories, Robert Ferguson shows how particular
narrative pieces of a proceeding can be repressed and contained outside an official trial record.
See Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 84 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
39. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 53.
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facts and analysis which they include in their published opinions., 4 0 The
reasons for this editing can range from the benign (trying to keep an opinion
to a manageable length), to the problematic (tailoring the facts, perhaps
subconsciously, to fit a personal or political agenda), to the corrupt
(reaching a decision based on bribery). And we must remain largely
ignorant of these reasons and editorial choices because we have no way to
test the final, published narrative against its building blocks in the overall
record-all we see is what the judge wants us to see. In short, the decision
to conceal or foreground a narrative is a rhetorical decision that was made
long before the printed page passes before our eyes. But we can sometimes
catch that decision's shadow in a case in which multiple judges write
opinions.
Let's take an example. Ake v. Oklahoma grew out of an especially
horrid multiple homicide that took place outside Oklahoma City in the late
1970s.41 The crime had a deep public impact, so much so that I recall
people still talking about it in private conversations when I practiced law in
Oklahoma City some fifteen years later. One of the murderers, Glen Burton
Ake, was convicted of the crime, but he appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that the State of Oklahoma had violated his due
process rights by failing to provide him with a psychiatrist to testify in his
42defense. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, had to say: "Late in
1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple
and wounding their two children."4 3 The remainder of his factual recitation
deals with Ake's mental instability, pretrial psychiatric treatment, and
competence to stand trial.44  Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, had a much
different story to tell:
Petitioner Ake and his codefendant Hatch quit their jobs on an oil
field rig in October 1979, borrowed a car, and went looking for a
location to burglarize. They drove to the rural home of Reverend and
Mrs. Richard Douglass, and gained entrance to the home by a ruse.
Holding Reverend and Mrs. Douglass and their children, Brooks and
Leslie, at gunpoint, they ransacked the home; they then bound and
gagged the mother, father, and son, and forced them to lie on the living
room floor. Ake and Hatch then took turns attempting to rape 12-year-
old Leslie Douglass in a nearby bedroom. Having failed in these
efforts, they forced her to lie on the living room floor with the other
40. Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1165.
41. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985).
42. Id. at 73-74.
43. Id. at 70.
44. Id. at 70-73.
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members of her family.
Ake then shot Reverend Douglass and Leslie each twice, and Mrs.
Douglass and Brooks once, with a .357 magnum pistol, and fled. Mrs.
Douglass died almost immediately as a result of the gunshot wound;
Reverend Douglass' death was caused by a combination of the
gunshots he received, and strangulation from the manner in which he
was bound. Leslie and Brooks managed to untie themselves and to
drive to the home of a nearby doctor. Ake and his accomplice were
apprehended in Colorado following a month-long crime spree that took
them through Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and other States in the
western half of the United States.45
Why such a contrast between the two opinions? Justice Marshall has
concluded that Ake's rights were violated and that his conviction should be
46
reversed. Straying into the facts of the crime itself could only detract
from the rhetorical inevitability of that holding.47 Justice Rehnquist, on the
other hand, believed that Ake was a faker and pointed to evidence in the
record in which Ake told a cellmate that he was going to "play crazy."48
Thus, Justice Rehnquist wanted to paint Ake as acting with conscious
deliberation as he went about his heinous acts-i.e., he may have been
Satanic, but he was sane. 49 A reader, however, cannot go further because
there is not enough evidence. But one can see that Justice Marshall must
shunt the multiple-murder-attempted-rape-of-a-twelve-year-old story to the
side to stake his claim to authority, whereas Justice Rehnquist must do the
opposite.
The second point of the analysis is that a casebook editor further
eliminates content, generally to draw attention to a particular doctrinal
aspect of a case. An editor selects cases because she believes that each of
them well illustrates a rule, the development of a rule, or the application of
a rule; thus, each case is edited and slotted into a casebook according to the
editor's overall organizational rubric. If context adds meaning-and I think
it indisputably does-then where an opinion is placed in a casebook adds an
important dimension to the opinion. Here is an illustration: I just pulled
four antitrust casebooks from my bookshelf, one by Andersen and Rogers
45. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 88 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 86-87.
47. For a thorough rhetorical analysis of Ake, see Shulamit Almog, As I Read, I Weep-In
Praise ofJudicial Narrative, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 471, 479-84 (2001).
48. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. See Almog, supra note 47, at 483. Justice Rehnquist renders Ake's acts purposeful by
carefully selecting active verbs that form a coherent sequence linking the initial acts of quitting a
job and borrowing a car to the ultimate crimes of attempted child rape and murder. Id.
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that I use in the course I teach at Southern Methodist University,o one from
a practitioners' seminar I took about ten years ago by Areeda and Kaplow,5 1
and two others that publishers have sent me for review, the first by Morgan
52
and the second by Goetz and McChesney. I searched through each to see
what the editors had done with one of the most-cited cases in all of private
antitrust litigation, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
Andersen and Rogers edit the case down to a bit more than five pages
(including eight of the opinion's original footnotes) and place it as the first
case in a section entitled "Private Enforcement." 54 That placement makes
sense, given that the case is more important in the civil litigation context
than in others, such as criminal enforcement. Morgan slims the case down
by another page, largely by using only two footnotes, and lodges it at the
end of the first subsection called "The Transition Cases" in a chapter
focusing on developments since 1975. Morgan emphasizes history over
practical application in his casebook, so he has selected Brunswick as one of
several examples of the modem Supreme Court's application of economic
analysis to antitrust problems and to show how the Court began to change
56the field of operation of the federal antitrust laws. In short, he locates the
case within a historical narrative and uses it as an element of his retelling of
that narrative. The other two casebooks, Areeda/Kaplow and
Goetz/McChesney, do not reprint Brunswick at all. Areeda and Kaplow,
however, include a summary of the case and quote the sentence for which
Brunswick is most often cited in a subsection entitled "Antitrust Injury,"57
50. WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE
(3d ed. 1999).
51. PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES
(4th ed. 1988).
52. THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS
ORIGINS (3d ed. 2005); CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW:
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (3d ed. 2006).
53. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Matic, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). This case is
important because it limits the category of private plaintiffs entitled to sue under the federal
antitrust laws to those who can show "antitrust injury," a concept that has proven slippery in
subsequent attempts at application. Id. at 489 ("Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to
say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes the defendants' acts unlawful.").
54. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 50, at 754-59.
55. MORGAN, supra note 52, at 486-90.
56. To this day, that process continues. For instance, the United States Supreme Court
recently held that vertical price fixing (resale price maintenance) should no longer be considered
per se illegal and should be viewed under the rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Products v.
PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888-89 (2007). In taking this step, the Court overruled one of its most
venerable precedents, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882.
57. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 51, at 96-97.
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while Goetz and McChesney reprint cases that cite to Brunswick.
What do these various approaches tell us? At the one extreme, Goetz
and McChesney imply that Brunswick itself is less important than the more
recent cases that cite it. In some ways, though, this is like reading the last
chapter in a novel without reading the first chapter. 9 Granted, a casebook
cannot include all-or even many-cases in a series, but it seems to me that
foundational cases that have led to splintered or confused subsequent
authority are worth direct analysis. One step up the ladder is Areeda and
Kaplow's one-paragraph summary of Brunswick, which reduces the case to
a rule, supported by a few sentences of factual recitation and commentary.
If there is a teleology to the case method, then the Areeda and Kaplow
approach to Brunswick neatly illustrates it: important cases can be boiled to
an essence. This may often be true, but it guides students towards a very
narrow way of reading. And, as Kissam suggests, it also tacitly teaches
students that if that is all there is to the lawyerly enterprise, then there are
surely more efficient ways of getting to and mastering rules than rooting
them out of musty casebooks like truffles from the forest floor: one
common method is to turn to commercial outlines, in which the truffles
come pre-rooted.6o But no matter what option the beginning student takes,
[all this] is likely to encourage an analytical, instrumentalist way of
reading to obtain "the rules" of at least "the major" cases, for it is these
rules that will seem most available and desirable to a bewildered,
disoriented law student or to one who is simply pressed for time.
Understanding "the rules" will appear to be a rational means of
preparing for class discussions and especially for examinations, where
students need a grasp of many legal rules and case holdings in order to
identify issues and apply such law quickly to novel situations. This
instrumentalist reading as a routine will focus students on a certain
analysis of texts to discover the rules, but it ignores and tacitly
discounts other ways of reading that would seek to ascertain the
contexts of judicial decisions, solve underlying legal problems,
interpret or synthesize complicated legal authorities, or use judicial
61
texts to construct complex arguments.
The other two antitrust casebooks that we have been discussing
attempt to avoid the rule-based trap by placing Brunswick in a larger
58. GOETZ & MCCHESNEY, supra note 52, at 70, 222, 391.
59. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-38 (1986) (likening the
development of the common law to a "chain novel," in which successive chapters are written by
different authors).
60. See KISSAM, supra note 22, at 33.
61. Id. at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).
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context. I must admit that the practitioner in me favors the Andersen and
Rogers approach, five pages of opinion, because it underscores the
62foundational importance of the case to civil litigation. But, ultimately,
this is to locate Brunswick and the rule it enunciates within a larger set of
rules, principally Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which confers a private right
of action on certain persons injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust
laws.63 Morgan, on the other hand, places the case within a historical
context, one that reveals an underlying shift in one of the United States'
64
most central public narratives: the story of Big Business. If one reads a
novel like Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, it's easy to see how that public
65
narrative had tipped in a decidedly populist direction. The Sherman
Antitrust Act is a product of that narrative (and the era) no less than the
66Meat Inspection Act. Furthermore, the Sherman Act's enforcement for the
next several decades reflected those origins, since many common business
practices were ruled per se illegal, no matter their actual impact on
67
consumer welfare.
In the post-World War II period, the populist, anti-business narrative
waned, and by the 1970s-as Morgan points out-the United States
Supreme Court increasingly directed lower courts and enforcement agencies
to consider the "reasonableness" of practices that had theretofore been
deemed unworthy of analysis beyond proof that the alleged conduct had in
fact occurred.6 8 The reasons for this are complicated and subject to ongoing
dispute, but there is no doubt that the Court changed direction and that that
69
change could be marked over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. For our
62. See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 50, at 754-59.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
64. MORGAN, supra note 52, at 486-90.
65. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Penguin 1985) (1906). The Jungle attacked a wide range
of business practices, ranging from workers' rights, to antitrust, to environmental pollution. Id.
But it was the disgusting nature of food processing that resonated most deeply with the public.
See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF
1906 229 (1989). On the heels of public outcry, Congress passed the Meat Inspection Act, which
regulated the conduct of the meat packing industry. Id. at 242; see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 339
F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2003). Similarly, the Sherman Act sought to prohibit the economic bad
acts (e.g., monopolization and price fixing) of large business trusts-which included the Beef
Trust-that resulted in high prices and low quality. See generally MORGAN, supra note 52, at 25-
31.
66. The current version of this law can be found at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2006).
67. See e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218, 251-54 (1940)
(recognizing price fixing as per se illegal); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897).
68. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50, 57-59 (1977) (placing
territorial restraints on franchisee by franchisor subject to rule of reason); see also MORGAN,
supra note 52.
69. What Morgan correctly suggests is that change was inevitable by the early 1970s.
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purposes, it is enough to note that this narrative revision happened and that
Morgan identifies it, thus signaling a possible way of reinvigorating some
pedagogical practices. What I am thinking of here are the dimensions that a
narrative approach to legal materials might offer. What if-in addition to
the public-narrative framework that Morgan employs-students were
encouraged to examine the personal narratives that gave rise to particular
disputes in the first place? Such an approach would give students a greater
sense of how many rules are formed and provide a corrective to the greatest
shortcoming of appellate opinions: viz., their inherent narrowness of scope,
a subject that calls for greater scrutiny. 0
THE PROBLEM WITH APPELLATE PRACTICE AND
APPELLATE OPINIONS
Lawyers become so accustomed to reading appellate opinions for rules
that it is easy for them to forget how narrowly those opinions are cast-e.g.,
they have a limited purpose, are subject to powerful generic constraints, and
are built on a rhetoric of justification, not description. First, and in some
ways most important, appeals are based on particularized points of asserted
error in the proceedings below. At the level of the United States Supreme
Court, then, it is most unusual for the Court to consider more than one or
two narrowly framed issues, and those are selected because of their general
importance, not because of their impact on the actual litigants before the
Court. These limitations are not a matter of speculation or practitioners'
folklore; they are institutionalized in the Court's rules. For example, Rule
10, which sets forth the considerations governing review on a writ of
certiorari, specifically states that only extraordinary cases are subject to
review, typically cases that involve conflicting decisions among United
States courts of appeals or between those courts and state courts of last
resort on an "important matter."7 1 This means that "[a] petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous
MORGAN, supra note 52, at 467. The economy had become so complex that per se rules could no
longer be trusted to produce desired results, and many older decisions either made little sense in
the revised context or could not be logically extended to new situations or technologies. Id. At
the same time, influential critics like Robert Bork and Richard Posner made powerful thrusts
against the received wisdom; these critics found sympathetic ears amongst the judiciary, including
the Supreme Court, the composition of which radically changed with the turnover of four seats
between 1970 and 1975. Id.
70. It's also worth mentioning that classroom practices exacerbate the impetus of the appellate
opinion to narrow: "instructors encourage students to construct a particular form of knowledge-a
legal understanding of events that filters out some aspects of the narratives under analysis while
selecting and extracting the legally relevant 'fact pattern' for attention." CARNEGIE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 63.
71. SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
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factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law"72 and
assures that only a certain type of case is heard. In addition to Rule 10,
Rule 14 assures that the case is narrowly presented in a way that suppresses
the matter's narrative aspects.7 This rule, which mandates the content (and
thereby the non-content) of a petition for a writ of certiorari, reveals a
decidedly anti-narrative bias, one focused on narrowly cast legal
questions. 7 4 It essentially directs that all appellants use a one-size-fits-all
formula under which:
* The questions presented for review [must be] expressed
concisely in relation to the circumstances of the case, without
unnecessary detail. The questions should be short and should
not be argumentative or repetitive. . . . The questions shall be
set out on the first page following the cover, and no other
75information may appear on that page....
* A concise statement of the case set[s] out the facts material to
consideration of the questions presented ... 76
* A direct and concise argument ampliflies] the reasons relied
on for allowance of the writ.77
* A petition for a writ of certiorari should be stated briefly and
78in plain terms.
* The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity,
and clarity whatever is essential to ready and adequate
understanding of the points requiring consideration is
79
sufficient reason for the Court to deny a petition.
This emphasis on concision, directness, and brevity has certain
consequences, the most important being that from the very outset, a
Supreme Court appeal will have a tightly circumscribed, rule-focused
ambit. It should come as no surprise, then, that most appellate opinions
mirror the petitions of which they are mere culminations.
Professor Robert Ferguson has identified a number of generic
characteristics in appellate opinions: a monologic voice, an interrogative
72. SUP. CT. R. 10.
73. SUP. CT. R. 14.
74. Id.
75. SUP. CT. R. 14(i)(a).
76. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(g).
77. SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(h).
78. SUP. CT. R. 14(3).
79. SUP. CT. R. 14(4).
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mode, and a declarative tone, all of which cohere in what he refers to as
"rhetoric of inevitability."80 As Ferguson correctly notes, the question that
a court chooses to answer-and the way that it chooses to frame that
question-is so fundamental that the process becomes "the methodological
anchor of judicial rhetoric."8 Not surprisingly, therefore, appellate counsel
devote much attention to hitting just the right notes in the version of the
question presented that they intend to sponsor because "[t]hey understand
what an earlier member of the profession, Francis Bacon, observed four
centuries ago: the questions we ask shape our knowledge far more than do
the theories we propose." 82 In practice, this means that every stroke of the
oar-from start to finish in the appellate process-will be aimed at guiding
the court to a "correct" statement of a question (or a few questions).
By emphasizing the generic importance of questions presented in
appellate opinions, it is not meant to deny that those opinions have a
narrative dimension. They do. But it is a type of narrative quite different
from the complex of narratives that makes up the case prior to its arrival at
the appellate court. The appellate narrative is, as Ferguson explains, driven
by a declarative tone, one designed at once to simplify and to convey
certitude:
The courtroom, as forum, takes the complexity of event-the original
disruption that provokes legal action in the first place-and transfers
aspects of that complexity into a narrative, the written form of which is
a literal transcript of what has been said in court.
The judicial opinion then appropriates, molds, and condenses that
transcript in a far more cohesive narrative of judgment, one that gives
the possibility of final interpretation by turning an original event into a
legal incident for judgment. Judgment, in turn, guides a general
cultural understanding of the original event for consumption beyond
the courtroom. . . . Every step of the process requires an unavoidable
series of simplifications. Judgment must reduce event to an incident
and further reduce incident to a narrative about acceptable behavior.
This is its mission. Everything about the enterprise, including the
listener-reader of theludicial opinion, welcomes the declarative tones
that make it possible.
80. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201,
213 (1990).
81. Id. at 208.
82. Id. (citing William J. Chambliss, Toward a Radical Criminology, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 230 (David Kairys ed., 1982)).
83. Id. at 211. Sanford Levinson has noted how the tone of confidence present in most
appellate opinions often obscures an underlying ambivalence. Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of
the Judicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 189 (Peter
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This is just another aspect of the process by which particulars can become
universals and of how individual, personal narratives can become strands in
a higher-order narrative fabric (e.g., a new legal rule can grow out of the
stories told in case of first impression). This process of narrative distillation
is effective at making rules, but it impedes the process of understanding
rules because it necessarily obscures their narrative roots. And the editing
of opinions for inclusion in casebooks thickens the cloak that is always
already wrapped around an appellate opinion. Is there a classroom solvent
that will help strip away this cloak?
(RE)INTRODUCING NARRATIVES IN THE CLASSROOM
This Article proposes such a solvent: more exposure to the narratives,
large and small, that underlie case opinions. The method does not suggest
an abandonment of all rule-based teaching; rather, it advocates the greater
use of narrative material across the curriculum so that students will have
84
another set of tools with which to evaluate and criticize legal propositions.
If the original justification for common law rules usually follows the rubric
of the normative/narrative syllogism, then in any given case, it would be
helpful to know what narrative elements figured, or did not figure, in the
formulation of the premises that led to the conclusion.8s Armed with that
information, a reader has an important critical tool with which to evaluate
the original legitimacy or the continuing vitality of precedent. As the
Carnegie Report puts it, "[a]wareness of narrative and context bring[s] ...
principles alive while also giving conceptual nuance to their meaning."
The following examples illustrate the point. First, there are the relatively
easy situations in which certain lines of cases are tainted because of
corruption. For instance, because of the Oklahoma Supreme Court scandal
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Oklahoma practitioners view many
Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds., 1996). "How often," he asks, "does one find a judicial opinion that
frankly says that the question is an exceedingly close one ... ?" Id. Not often. Id. The reason,
he suggests, is that a turn to judicial modesty in the face of a close call might be taken as a sign of
the "terrifying arbitrariness that underlies much of the legal system" and as proof that any decision
results from something other than the operation of the rule of law. Id.
84. It may be that certain types of narrative materials (I'm thinking especially of literature)
may be better suited to some subjects than others. Simon Stern proposes, for instance, that novels
may contribute to our understanding of evidence law (and vice versa) because "[t]he legal
question of evidence and the literary question of closure converge as aspects of legal aesthetics."
Simon Stem, Literary Evidence and Legal Aesthetics, in TEACHING LITERATURE AND LAW 13
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1378337 (follow
"One-Click Download" hyperlink).
85. GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 2 (showing how legal rules are modified over time to
encompass new situations while still following an if-then justificatory pattern).
86. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 124 (discussing interaction of narratives and legal
principles in the context of clinical education).
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87
opinions authored by Justice Nelson Corn with suspicion. But relatively
few readers outside Oklahoma know that, and the opinions still appear right
there in the Pacific Reporter, waiting for the unwitting to read and rely on
them. They bear no facially evident mark of the bribes that may have
influenced any one of them. In fact, most of them seem reasonable, and an
impartial, uncorrupted judge may very well have decided them the same
way. But they are nonetheless illegitimate, and we can only know that
through narratives existing outside the opinions themselves.
More troublesome are opinions that are driven by bias, yet manage to
mask the fact with an admixture of authoritative tone and high-sounding
rhetorical devices. 89  This is to say that not all biased decisions proud
announce themselves as such in the transparent manner of Plessy,
Muller,91 or Bowers.92 Hoeflich neatly illustrates this in a discussion of Taft
v. Hyatt,9 3 a case that is often cited for a basic contract principle and is
sometimes anthologized or summarized in casebooks.94
First is a summary of the case, followed by Hoeflich's conclusions
87. See Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of
Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1341, 1462 (1995). Justice Corn was convicted and
imprisoned for evading federal income tax on bribes that he had taken while sitting on the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1950s. See The Law: Oklahoma's Shocking Scandal, TIME, Apr.
16, 1965, available athttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,841846.00.html.
88. A similar-and more widely known-example is that of Judge Martin Manton, a former
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Hoeflich, supra note
29, at 1167. Judge Manton was widely admired for his skill in handling bankruptcy cases. But,
alas, Judge Manton fell upon hard times himself (he had built a considerable real estate empire in
New York that suffered after the Crash of 1929), and he began to entertain bribes. Id. Thereafter,
"[h]e continued to write model decisions in bankruptcy cases complete with factual and analytic
narratives appropriate to the results. What he did not include in these published decisions was the
fact that really decided the cases: who paid him the highest bribe." Id.
89. I am not offering these observations as a sponsorship of a Realist or CLS claim that all
legal decisions are arbitrary, political, or elitist. That argument is for another day. Here, I intend
for us to test the notion that, for instance, there are prosaic cases that may have been covertly
influenced by the type of racial animus that is overtly stated in Dred Scott or Plessy. We can do
this, I think, without deciding how far one should push Llewellyn's famous fillip that "our
government is not a government of laws, but one of laws through men." Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1243 (1931). For a
summary of CLS positions on judicial discretion and indeterminacy, see Stephen B. Presser, Some
Realism about Orphism or The Critical Legal Studies Movement and the New Great Chain of
Being, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 869 (1984).
90. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
91. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
92. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
93. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213 (Kan. 1919).
94. See Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1167-79.
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based on his reading of it, followed in turn by an analysis of observations
that would leave a law class suspended in a state of indeterminacy that is
nonetheless instructive.9 5 The case was essentially an interpleader action in
which members of a group that had offered a reward for the apprehension
of a criminal pled (i.e., paid) money into a court so that rival claimants
could set up their respective claims to the reward. 96 One of the three
claimants had prevailed in the trial court.97 The background facts are these:
on May 16, 1917, residents of a small southeastern Kansas town, Parsons,
learned that Agnes Smith-the wife of a local physician, Dr. Asa Smith-
98had been assaulted (she later died). Another physician, Dr. Robert Smith,
was suspected of the crime; he soon went into hiding.99 All three of the
Smiths were African-Americans.100 At some point before the afternoon of
May 17, a local group that Hoeflich identifies as the Anti-Horse Thief
Association (referred to as A.H.T.A. in the opinion) offered and publicized
a $750 reward for the arrest or information leading to the arrest of Robert
Smith.1or Dr. Asa Smith was a member of this group.102
During the afternoon of May 17, William Hyatt, a Parsons attorney,
learned that Robert Smith wanted to meet with him. 103 Hyatt went to
Smith's hideout, where "[t]he two talked together for an hour or more, but
were unable to reach an agreement as to the employment of Hyatt to defend
Smith.,104 Before this meeting, Hyatt knew of the reward. os In what may
be a recurring lawyer fantasy (unacted upon, one would hope) in the face of
a potential client unwilling to put up a retainer, Hyatt returned from the
meeting and immediately told the county attorney where Smith was
hiding. He even accompanied the deputy sheriff on the mission to arrest
Smith. 107 But in the meantime, Smith had been spirited away to nearby
Oswego, Kansas, by a group of five members of the Lodge of Colored
Masons and Thomas Murry, the chief of police of Parsons, all of whom
considered Smith's fears of mob violence well-founded.'os Before the party
95. See Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1167-79.
96. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213 (Kan. 1919).
97. Id. at 213-14.
98. Id. at 214.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1169.
102. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 214 (Kan. 1919).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 214 (Kan. 1919).
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left for Oswego, where Smith was ultimately placed in the custody of the
Labette County Sheriff, Murry placed Smith under arrest.1 09 At the time of
that arrest, Murry knew of the reward; the rest of the group did not.1
Hyatt, Murry, and the five members of the Colored Masons all claimed that
the reward was theirs.1 '
At trial, Hyatt prevailed, and the other claimants appealed that
judgment.112 The Kansas state supreme court took each of the rivaling
claims in turn and found them all wanting.1 13 Hyatt, the court held, was not
eligible to receive the reward because his actions (even setting aside his
unconscionable use of prospective client information for his own pecuniary
gain) did not lead to the arrest of Smith.114 It surely could have-had Smith
remained at their meeting place-but it did not. Specifically, the court
found: (1) the information Hyatt gave would have led to the arrest of Smith,
had the authorities acted promptly, and (2) the fact that his information did
not lead to an arrest was through no fault of his own.115 But none of that
helped Hyatt's case because, in fact, others were the producing cause of the
arrest.116 Thus, the court curtly concluded, "Hyatt might as well have kept
his information to himself."" Murry's actions, on the contrary, actually
did lead to Smith's arrest-he in fact arrested him. 1 8  But the court
acknowledged and relied on well-settled law that a police officer may not
"claim a reward for merely doing his duty."119 In other words, because
Murry was the chief of police, he had a duty to arrest fugitives and others
criminal suspects. So even though he had no warrant, he nonetheless had
reasonable grounds for believing Smith had committed the offense
charged.120
That left the collective claim of the members of the Colored Masons.
It is this claim that led to the establishment of the rule for which the case is
most often cited.121 The critical facts for the court were that this group of
109. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 214 (Kan. 1919).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 214.
113. Id. at 214-15.
114. Id. at 215.
115. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 215 (Kan. 1919).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 215.
118. Id. at 214.
119. Id. at 215.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Alexander v. Russo, 571 P.2d 350, 358 (Kan. App. 1977). As stated in Taft v.
Hyatt:
A private offer of reward for the apprehension of an accused person stands, as a general rule,
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claimants "had not heard of the offer of the reward until after the accused
had been surrendered to the sheriff' and acted out of a desire to protect
Smith from mob violence, not to bring him to justice.122 These facts,
coupled with the legal holding that a private-as opposed to a statutory-
offer of a reward should be analyzed under contract principles, stymied the
group's attempt to secure the reward.123 To reach this conclusion, the court
reasoned that a private reward offer is a "mere proposal" that, once
accepted, solidifies into a contract.124 So until someone takes affirmative
steps in reliance on the offer, there is no contract. But the court went even
further, stating that there must be an actual "meeting of the minds," which
cannot happen if the claimant performs his services before knowing of the
reward offer.125 Here, the facts were undisputed that the claimants simply
assisted Smith in surrendering: "Their testimony is that what they did was
for the purpose of protecting him from mob violence. They had never heard
of the reward, and of course, are not entitled to any part of it."12 6
This holding, as Hoeflich notes, was not compelled in any legal
sense.127 The issue presented was one of first impression in Kansas, as the
128Court's citation to a single out-of-state opinion reveals. From this,
Hoeflich begins to wonder whether there was something else afoot, so he
upon a different footing from an offer made by virtue of a statute. When accepted, the offer
becomes a contract; until it is accepted by some person, who upon the strength of the offer
takes some steps to earn the reward, there is no contract; and where a claimant of the reward
was not aware that it had been offered until after he had acted, he is not entitled to claim the
reward.
Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 213 (Kan. 1919).
122. Id. at 215.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127 Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1173-75. Cf Richard Posner, Jurisprudential Responses to
Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 326, 327 (1988). In a discussion of how formalists
sometimes "smuggl[e] policy choices into the premises for logical reasoning without analysis or
even acknowledgement," Judge Posner suggests that there may or may not be good reason to
recognize a claim for a reward only if the claimant knows of the reward:
Consider this question of perennial fascination to students of contract law: should a person be
allowed to claim, as a matter of contractual entitlement, a reward for returning a lost article,
if he did not actually know that a reward had been offered? Langdell said no. And he said it
on logical grounds: a contract requires-is defined to require-conscious acceptance; if the
person who returned the lost property did not know about the reward he could not have
accepted that unilateral offer, and therefore there is no duty to reward this person. Langdell's
mistake was to impose a definition on the word "contract" without considering why one
might want to make some promises and not others enforceable and what the effect of making
this promise enforceable would be. Would it lead to more returns or fewer? Actually this is
a difficult question but it is one that Langdell thought he did not even have to consider.
Id.
128. See Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 215 (Kan. 1919).
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digs deeper.129 The opinion itself tells us that Hyatt and Smith were
"unable to reach an agreement as to the employment of Hyatt to defend
Smith" and at least part of the reason was because "they did not agree upon
the fee to be paid for the defense."1 30 Hoeflich's investigation of the
appellate record shows that at trial only the members of the Colored
Masons were asked why they wanted the reward. 13 1  One claimant's
response (as abstracted in the record) is particularly telling: "Witness
testified that he was a friend of Dr. Smith; that he was interested in seeing
that mob violence was not resorted to; that he did not obligate himself or
pay anything towards the defense of Smith."1 32 In other words, the group
wanted the reward to pay for Smith's defense.
Because these questions have no relevance to the issue of knowledge
133
of the reward, Hoeflich is compelled to ask why they were asked. Could
it have something to do with the setting and circumstances-i.e., a black
man accused of murder in small Kansas town that was already on the verge
of forming a lynch mob? Did the townsfolk want to prevent Smith from
mounting an adequate defense through the use of the reward money? Could
this have influenced the outcome at trial and, perhaps, even on appeal? It is
of course impossible to answer these questions with certainty. It is logical
to conclude that the appellate court would not have been directly swayed by
a desire to withhold the reward money to keep Smith from using it for his
defense for the simple reason that Smith had b that time been convicted
and that conviction had already been affirmed. On the other hand, there
are good reasons to think that the supreme court may have been indirectly
influenced, if only because of the institutional tendency to show deference
to trial court decisions. And-based on a further investigation of the
underlying murder case-there are even better reasons to think that the trial
court may have been swept along by the racial undercurrents that Hoeflich
senses in Taft v. Hyatt.
In Taft, the murder of Agnes Smith was reduced to the passing
reference that she had been "assaulted" and then, in a parenthetical aside, to
the fact that she had died and that Robert Smith had been charged and
convicted of her murder. 135 But this was no ordinary murder. The narrative
has plot elements straight out of Greek tragedy and is reminiscent of
129 Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1173.
130. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 214-15 (Kan. 1919).
131. Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1174.
132. Id. (quoting Abstract of Appellants at 14, Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213 (Kan. 1919) (No.
21879) (emphasis added)).
133. Id.
134. See generally State v. Smith, 174 P. 551 (Kan. 1918) (affirming Smith's conviction).
135. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213, 214 (Kan. 1919).
2010] 643
Loyola Law Review
modem Greek-influenced dramas like Eugene O'Neill's Desire Under the
Elms. The list of major dramatis personae might read something like
this:
Dr. Asa Smith-A black physician; once widowed; now over 60.
Robert Smith-Also a black physician; now 33; employed by Asa
Smith since he was 13.
Agnes Smith-Wife of Asa Smith for one year; lived with the first
Mrs. Smith prior to her death; partially educated by Asa; now 24.137
The respective ages of the players suggest a couple of familiar plotlines,
one of which is borne out by the facts of the case. At trial, Smith was
convicted largely on the strength of Mrs. Smith's "dying statement," a large
portion of which was read to the jury as an exception to the general rule
against hearsay:
"I know that I am about to die and this is my statement in the fear of
death. Bob Smith came in at about 11 o'clock A. M., May 16th and
says, 'Why don't you treat me better-why have you got it in for me?'
I picked up some scissors, off the table, and he started for me and he
took them away from me and seized me by the throat and choked me
and threw me on the floor. He choked me and poured something in
my mouth and face and ran out, and I got up and got to Mrs.
Neighbors' and lost consciousness."' 3 8
From the testimony of one of the attending physicians, we learn what
the "something" was that led to her particularly gruesome and drawn out
death (she survived for about a week):
Agnes Smith was found to be burned with carbolic acid. Dr.
Boardman testified that:
"The odor was very strong. The acid was up in her hair, over her
face, and down on her upper chest. The acid was upon her cheeks,
around the back of her neck, and around her ears. Her eyes were
entirely burned. One had turned entirely white. *** She was
unconscious." 39
On appeal, Smith's most significant claim of error was that Agnes
136. See EUGENE O'NEILL, DESIRE UNDER THE ELMS (1994), reprinted in THREE PLAYS 1
(Vintage 1995).
137. State v. Smith, 174 P. 551, 551-52 (Kan. 1918).
138. Id. at 552.
139. Id. at 552.
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Smith's dying declaration should not have been received into evidence.140
For reasons that are unimportant to the discussion, the court concluded that
141the statement was proper evidence. More telling, perhaps, was the
court's quotation of the portion of the statement that was not read to the
jury: "I told him to get out of the house, and *** I feared he would rape
me."142 Since this excised portion of Agnes Smith's statement was not
directly at issue in the appeal, it seems to me that it may signal the crux of
the matter for the supreme court. If one recalls that the dominant racial
narrative in predominantly white interpretive communities in the late
twentieth century portrayed young black males as feral and threatening to
civil society (think of the King-beating case), then this would undoubtedly
have been the case in the early twentieth century.143 In other words, the
supreme court may well have concluded that Smith was just another out-of-
control black man unable to control his appetites, despite overwhelming
evidence of his good character and at least something more than a mere
suggestion that Agnes Smith was suicidal. In other words, a murder and
attempted rape could have seemed like the only coherent narrative available
to the all-white, all-male Kansas supreme court of a hundred years ago. It
may be overreaching a bit, but there is an echo of racial stereotyping in the
court's last substantive paragraph: "The record leads to the inevitable
conviction that the cruel and atrocious crime charged was committed, and
whatever influences actuated him, or whatever their source, the defendant
was legally found guilty."l 44
At a minimum, all this buttresses Hoeflich's suspicion that race may
have played some part in Taft v. Hyatt.145 It does not mean that that the
supreme court strained to deprive the Colored Masons of the reward for
racist reasons. Perhaps nothing was amiss at all. But perhaps there was a
desire to keep solidarity with the decisions of the trial court below and with
the court's own holdings only a year before in State v. Smith. The point is,
though, that one cannot even have this type of discussion-cannot engage
in critical reading-without going outside the four corners of an appellate
opinion. A fortiori, one cannot have this type of discussion when salient
facts have been bobbed from a casebook version or, even more to the point,
when the facts have been sanitized so as to present an intentionally
140. State v. Smith, 174 P. 551, 556 (Kan. 1918).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
143. The Rodney King case arose from an arrest, which was recorded on videotape, and a
subsequent trial that repeatedly invoked racial stereotypes, including references to King as a
"gorilla." See JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTICE: RODNEY KING AND O.J. SIMPSON IN
A HOUSE DIVIDED 51 (1996).
144. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
145. See Hoeflich, supra note 29, 1173-75.
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unparticularized statement of the case, presumably to minimize distraction
from the statement of universalized doctrine. Take, for example, the
version of Taft v. Hyatt that appeared in Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisenberg's
contracts casebook:
Smith, a member of a masonic lodge, was suspected of a murder which
had aroused the indignation of the community. Smith conveyed his
fears of mob violence to certain of his masonic brothers and asked
their protection. They accompanied a police officer to his hiding place
and in the company of the officer took Smith to the sheriff, who placed
him in the county jail. Just before the party got into the cab to go to
the sheriffs office, Smith was told by the officers that he was under
arrest. The masons now claim a reward of $750 which had been
offered by the husband of the murdered woman "for the arrest or
information which will lead to the arrest" of Smith. Held, they were
not entitled because (1) they did not know of the offer until after Smith
was arrested, and (2) they merely assisted Smith in surrendering
himself and therefore did not arrest him or give information leading to
his arrest within the meaning of the offer.'46
Every hint of race is erased from this summary, making it impossible
to ask the questions about the case that we just asked. 14 In fairness,
casebook editors have to make choices and not every case can be presented
in an extensive form. Also, learning to extract legal rules from cases and
manipulate them is a valuable lawyerly skill. Nonetheless, I think that law
students should learn to dig in to cases from time to time (maybe three or
four cases per semester) as a way of sharpening their critical reading skills
and, thereby, their analytical writing skills.148 Now is a perfect time to
146. Hoeflich, supra note 29, at 1178 (quoting LON L. FULLER & MELvIN EISENBERG, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 414-15 (3d ed. 1972)).
147. I don't mean to suggest that the technique that I am sponsoring is simply a way to reveal
bias in a Realist sort of way. For example, I think one could take a case like Brunswick and show
how it represents the waning of a public narrative that had romanticized (and legally protected)
mom-and-pop businesses and vilified big business from at least the time of Teddy Roosevelt.
148. See Kissam, supra note 27, at 2006-09 (discussing, among other things, the link between
reading critically and writing well). The Carnegie Report puts it this way: "It is important . .. that
instructors also give students experience with fuller accounts of cases in which students can grasp
the different meaning of 'facts' from opposing points of view." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note
18, at 53. And I am inclined to go beyond actual case materials. Robert Ferguson has spoken of
the "continuum of publication" that marks a trial, from things like pleadings to things like fictional
projections. Ferguson, supra note 38, at 84. I thus think it makes sense to compare various
narrative approaches. To take one example, one could juxtapose opinions of the various courts
involved in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), with the movie Silkwood. In
the court opinions, Karen Silkwood's personal narrative is reduced to a few lines and then silted
over with page upon page of the history of and intent behind the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and
its subsequent amendments. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). In the film,
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implement this type of curricular change because it has never been easier to
accomplish. As most courts have migrated to electronic filing, all manner
of case materials have become readily available for downloading. It has
therefore become a much simpler matter to build a case file that includes
pleadings, briefs, documentary evidence, and testimony. The value of the
reading-for-narratives approach can be expressed in a number of ways, but
none is more important than the possibility of revealing the narratives that
competed for victory, universalization, and institutionalization in any
particular case. In that way, young lawyers can more fully understand that
litigation is often no more than a competition to convince this judge, this
jury, and a majority of this appellate panel that one story or another
deserves favorable judgment. But it may be that in another time and place
that story is no longer convincing. In short, as Robert Ferguson suggests
(following Thoreau), we must carefully attend to what we read:
"Books," writes Henry Thoreau, "must be read as deliberately and
reservedly as they were written." The judicial opinion deserves the
same injunction. Judges use words to secure shared explanations and
identifications; they also use them as weapons of control. Deliberation
with reservation explores that distinction, and the result is more than
understanding. Here and elsewhere, a practiced appreciation or
resourcefulness in language is the first safeguard in a republic of
laws.
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION AND THE LAW
What is being argued for here is a more thorough melding of black-
letter law and theory in legal education.150 The advantages of this type of
approach would not, however, be limited to placing yet another
argumentative arrow in the future litigator's quiver. Rather, Ferguson is
exactly right to suggest that a "readerly" approach to the law can help shore
up the democratic values that the easy rhetoric of formalism and the rules
she emerges as far more than a "decedent," and we are left to wonder whether anything
approaching justice was done in her case. I am, by the way, untroubled by the use of "fiction" in
the classroom setting-after all, teaching by way of hypotheticals is a law school stock-in-trade.
Wouldn't most law professors (at least grudgingly) concede that Nora Ehpron (the author of the
screenplay) is better at constructing a nuanced, full-blown hypothetical than they are, if only
because she was able to devote countless hours to the construction of her narrative? The same
could be said of Melville, Camus, Browning, Glaspell or many other authors that form the stock in
trade of law and literature scholars.
149. Ferguson, supra note 80, at 219 (footnotes omitted).
150. I think the Carnegie Report is correct in positing (after Amsterdam and Bruner) "that the
narrative structure of legal reasoning provides a natural deep structure capable of uniting theory
and practice." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 42.
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that drive it so often obscure. 51 Over twenty years ago, Neil MacCormick
suggested:
[T]here are six questions to which any serious approach to higher
education ought to allow of some answer, preferably one reached after
substantial reflection. In quick and summary form, the questions are:
(1) What is there? (2) What is the structure of the things there are, and
how do different kinds of existence interrelate? (3) How do we know
what there is, and how do we have acquaintance with the things that
exists [sic]? (4) By what method should we explain and expound the
various matters open to our knowledge? What is the place of human
beings as rational agents in relation to whatever else there is? and (6)
In light of all this, how are we to live and conduct ourselves?' 52
None of these questions is peculiar to law, but that is MacCormick's point.
For if one is truly to understand law, one must learn more than the
substance of a set of legal rules, rules that are always subject to defeasance
at the whim of a legislature or high court. This "more than" is not a single
identifiable technique but rather a range of skills that permit one to evaluate
laws critically in their social context. MacCormick's six questions mark a
path along which to gather these skills and, also, to build the quality of
intellect necessary to maintain the cornerstone role that law-as-profession
holds within a thriving democracy:
The questions are ones which ought to remain open and alive for every
law teacher, law student and indeed legal practitioner of whatever rank
and eminence. That they are fundamental for lawyering and for legal
education is one reason why a jurisprudence course is of structural and
vital importance to any law degree within the tradition of the
Democratic Intellect ... .
But this is not all. Legal education must be infused with matters of
theory and philosophy across the curriculum, not just through the pro forma
addition of an offering or two in jurisprudence or critical theory to the
upper-level run of law school courses. To underscore this position,
MacCornick invokes Zenon Bankowski and Geoff Mungham's Images of
Law, which warns of the temptation to lodge-and thereby emasculate and
marginalize-all matters critical and theoretical in separate courses.154 For
as the earlier discussion of Taft v. Hyatt shows, a critical approach may be
151. Ferguson, supra note 80, at 219.
152. Neil MacCormick, Democratic Intellect and the Law, 5 LEGAL STUD. 172, 177 (1985).
153. Id. at 180.
154. Id. at 181 (citing ZENON BANKOWSKI & GEOFF MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF LAW 1-6, 49-72
(1976)); see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 18, at 84 ("It is noteworthy . . . that jurisprudence
is rarely given an important place in the North American law school curriculum.").
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of most value in core, traditionally doctrinal subjects:
If theory courses and substantive law courses run on quite different
tracks, the theory part can become a purely decorative fifth wheel.
Moreover, theorists risk the criticism (which is in some cases more
than amply justified) that they lack any real interest in real law. So
155
theory and law are driven apart.
In the end, the programmatic and structural issues that I have sketched
with respect to legal education are a specific application of a larger cultural
critique. When Professor Edward Said called for a "democratic criticism"
rooted in humanism, he was urging scholars to find ways of overcoming the
burden of too much (yet too facilely packaged) information, on the one
hand, and too much balkanized (and jargon-laden) expertise, on the other:
We are bombarded by prepackaged and reified representations of the
world that usurp consciousness and preempt democratic critique, and it
is to the overturning and dismantling of these alien objects that, as C.
Wright Mills put so correctly, the intellectual humanist's work ought
to be devoted....
. . . . Expertise as a distancing device has gotten out of control,
especially in some academic forms of expression, to the extent that
156
they have become antidemocratic and even anti-intellectual.
The remedy lies, Said suggests, in forms of discourse that mandate
reflection and are built on what he calls "detail," a word that he uses in
much the same sense that I have used "narrative" throughout this article.15 1
For lawyers, this means that each of us must work to read legal texts in
ways that allow us to penetrate the omnipresent fog of rules and see the
stories for which those rules are often more or less accurate shorthand and
to write our own legal texts in ways that are both revealing and intelligible
to non-specialists. All this is to say that we should teach and practice law
democratically.
155. Neil MacCormick, Democratic Intellect and the Law, 5 LEGAL STUD. 172, 181 (1985).
156. EDWARD W. SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM 71, 73 (2003).
157. Id.
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